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Abstract 
This article examines whether crimes motivated by, or which demonstrate, gender ‘hostility’ 
should be included within the current framework of hate crime legislation in England and 
Wales. The article uses the example of rape to explore the parallels (both conceptual and 
evidential) between gender-motivated violence and other ‘archetypal’ forms of hate crime. It 
is asserted that where there is clear evidence of gender hostility during the commission of an 
offence, a defendant should be pursued in law additionally as a hate crime offender. In 
particular it is argued that by focusing on the hate-motivation of many sexual violence 
offenders, the criminal justice system can begin to move away from its current focus on the 
‘sexual’ motivations of offenders and begin to more effectively challenge the gendered 
prejudices that are frequently causal to such crimes. 
Keywords: Hate crime, gender hostility, rape, ‘rape myth acceptance’, criminal censure, 
prejudice. 
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Gendered violence 1  is a global phenomenon that continues to be both widespread 2  and 
physically, emotionally and socially harmful to those who are targeted.3  The media coverage 
of the brutal rape and murder of a 23 year old female student on a Delhi bus in 2012 caught the 
attention of the world’s media.4 While this case is just one in a long list of horrific incidents of 
violence directed against women across the globe, it has led to an international debate about 
the plights of sexually and physically victimised women. The public uproar caused by India’s 
sexual violence ‘problem’ has since led to the amendment of laws aimed at tackling sexual 
violence.5 Disturbingly, though, the young woman’s death represents just the tip of what seems 
to be an ever expanding iceberg of violence against women (henceforth VAW), with a recent 
report by the World Health Organisation highlighting that an estimated 35 per cent of all 
women globally experience physical or sexual violence at the hands of a current or ex-partner.6 
If we consider the fact that ‘gendered violence’ relates not just to rape and physical violence 
but also encompasses a wide variety of human rights abuses, including, inter alia, femicide,7 
                                                          
* School of Law, Politics and Sociology. Our thanks go to Alison Phipps, Hannah Mason-Bish and Marian 
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1 The term ‘gendered violence’ is used throughout this article in order to emphasis the gendered nature of 
much violence directed against women, while simultaneously acknowledging that violence towards men can 
also be ‘gendered’. The article will also refer to ‘violence against women’ (VAW),  a term which feminist 
scholars have coined in order to convey the message that violence is not gender-neutral (see A. K. Gill, and H. 
Mason-Bish, ‘Addressing violence against women as a form of hate crime: limitations and possibilities’ (2013) 
105 Feminist Review 1). We will often refer to these terms interchangeably. Other terms which have gained 
currency within the literature include ‘domestic violence’ and ‘intimate partner violence’. While we do not 
contest the use of these terms, we use the former phrases to reflect the potential for gender ‘hostility’ during 
offences committed against women.   
2 N. Westmarland and G. Gangoli, International Approaches to Rape (Bristol: Polity Press, 2011); Department of 
Economic and Social Affair (DESA), The World's Women 2010: Trends and Statistics (New York: United Nations, 
2010) 130-140; J.P. Hodge, Gendered Hate: Exploring Gender in Hate Crime Law (New England: Northeastern 
University Press, 2011) 2. 
3 See e.g., L. Kelly, J. Lovett and L. Regan, ‘A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases’ (2005) 293 
Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate 1. 
4 See e.g. BBC, ‘Delhi gang-rape victim dies in hospital in Singapore’ (December 29, 2012) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20860569 [Accessed June 24, 2013]. 
5 See e.g. BBC, ‘Explaining India's new anti-rape laws’ (December 29, 2012) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-21950197 [Accessed June 24, 2013]. 
6  World Health Organisation, Global and regional estimates of violence against women: Prevalence and health 
effects of intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence (WHO, 2013); see also DESA, n 2 above, 
130-140;  K. Smith, (ed.), D. Lader, J. Hoare & I. Lau, Hate crime, cyber security and the experience of crime 
among children: Findings from the 2010/11 British Crime Survey: Supplementary Volume 3 to Crime in England 
and Wales (London: Home Office, 2012) 25.  
2010/11 For a discussion on the methodological limitations of VAW victim surveys see, S. Walby and A. Myhill 
‘New Survey Methodologies in Researching Violence Against Women’ (2001) 41 British Journal of Criminology 
502. 
7 The United Nations states that ‘Femicide is the name given to the gender-based murder of women, implying 
that women are targeted and murdered solely on the basis of gender inequalities in contemporary societies.’ 
DESA, n 2 above, 134.  
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trafficking of women and girls, forced prostitution, and honour crimes,8 we begin to appreciate 
how VAW is a global problem of endemic proportions.9   
While from time to time VAW catches the attention of the media (especially in recent 
years) it is certainly by no means a recent phenomenon. It has, however, only been in the last 
few decades that the law has been used specifically to protect women from gendered violence. 
It seems almost inconceivable now to note that marital rape remained ‘legal’ in England and 
Wales until 1991. It took the English courts almost two centuries to abolish the common law 
rule that prohibited a male spouse from being prosecuted for raping his wife; finally meeting 
its death knell in the House of Lords decision in R v R.10  In that case, Lord Keith of Kinkel in 
his leading speech reflected that ‘the fiction of implied consent has no useful purpose to serve 
today in the law of rape’ – as if it really ever had. The case of R v R is a stark reminder of how 
slow the courts (and Parliament) have been to challenge and amend patriarchal formulations of 
English law. Part of the problem was that women’s experiences of violence remained largely 
hidden until victimologists and government agencies began to investigate it during the latter 
part of the 20th century.11 The seminal work of notable feminist activists and academics in the 
1970s, 80s and 90s has been pivotal in bringing female victimisation to the fore of public and 
political debate.12  
Significant to this article is that the majority of violent acts targeted against women are 
committed by men, highlighting the often gendered nature of much female victimisation.13 It 
is by no means new to feminist literature to highlight the gendered dynamics of VAW.  Sexual 
offences and domestic violence have, in particular, been conceptualised as conducts which are 
intended to subjugate and subordinate women, while simultaneously enforcing a male-
dominated social hierarchy.14 Indeed, the conceptualisation of gendered violence as a form of 
male hegemony is now a well-trodden path within feminist and socio-legal scholarship.15 Yet 
despite the gendered nature of many forms of VAW, this area of legal and criminological 
                                                          
8 As well as other social and cultural practices which have the effect of subjugating the rights and freedoms of 
women. 
9 See also C. Watts and C. Zimmerman, ‘Violence Against Women: Global Scope and Magnitude’ (2002) 359 
The Lancet 1232. 
10 R v R [1992] 1 AC 599.  
11 See generally, S. Walklate (ed), Handbook of Victims and Victimology (Cullompton: Willan, 2007) Part 2. 
12 Such as S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: The Ballintine Publishing Group, 
1975); and C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge, 1989); see also Walklate, ibid.  
13 See Hodge, n 2 above, 2. 
14 See e.g., Brownmiller, ibid; Smart, ibid; Hodge, n 2 above. See also B. Perry, In the Name of Hate: 
Understanding Hate Crimes (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
15 ibid.  
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scholarship has remained distant from another burgeoning area of academic study – that of 
‘hate crime’.16 This is a notable omission when we consider the targeted and bias nature of 
such offences. While some attempts have been made to include VAW within definitions of 
‘hate crime’ in the United States (US),17 its inclusion within the United Kingdom (UK) hate 
crime policy domain remains elusive. For instance, the Law Commission is currently 
considering the possible extension of the legislative framework on hate crime to include sexual 
orientation, disability and transgender identity within the current aggravated offences 
prescribed under sections 29-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Yet no mention is made 
of gender-based hostility. In his theory paper which accompanies the Commission’s 
consultation paper, John Stanton-Ife provides only a fleeting reference to gender, noting that:  
In the case of women victims, for example, a question to explore would be the extent to 
which women victims of relevant crimes have been selected in virtue of being women.18 
It is to this question which this article focuses. The paper will, in the main, direct its attention 
on the specific offence of rape. Rape is often a clear demonstration of male dominance over 
women19 and it is a salient example of when gendered violence might become a ‘hate crime’.20 
Like most other examples of VAW, the majority of rape victims are women with the offenders 
being men.21 Moreover rape, unlike intimate partner violence, is a specific offence which can 
only be committed by men. 22    
                                                          
16 There is no one agreed definition of hate crime, but common amongst most descriptions is that it includes 
offences which are motivated, or partly motivated, by prejudice, bigotry, or animus based on the victim’s 
group-based identity traits. See M. Walters, ‘A General Theories of Hate Crime: Strain, Doing Difference and 
Self Control’ (2011) 19(4) Critical Criminology 313. 
17 See Hodge, n 2 above. 
18 J. Stanton-Ife, Criminalising Conduct with Special Reference to Potential Offences of Stirring Up Hatred 
Against Disabled or Transgender Persons (2013) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Hate_Crime_Theory-Paper_Dr-John-Stanton-Ife.pdf [accessed at 
June 24th 2013]. This is despite the fact that the British Crime Survey has estimated that there are around 
120,000 incidents of gender-motivated hate crime each year – estimate is based on whether respondents of 
the survey perceived their experience of crime to be motivated by the offender’s attitude towards their 
gender, Smith et al, n 6 above, 25.  
19 See Hodge, n 2 above, 13. 
20 E. Rothschild, ‘Recognising another Face of Hate Crimes: Rape as a Gender-bias Crime’ (1993) 4 Maryland 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 231; J. Gaffney, ‘Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a 
Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases’ (1997) 6 Journal of Law and Policy 217; K.M. Carney, 
‘Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime’ (2001) 75 St. John’s Law Review 314. 
21 Hodge, n 2 above.  
22 Research and statistics have shown that men are also the victims of sexual violence and inter-personal 
violence. ibid, 13; see also statistics from the British Crime Survey, R. Chaplin, J. Flatley, and K. Smith, Crime in 
England and Wales: Findings from the British Crime Survey and Police Recorded Crime, Second Edition (London: 
Home Office, 2011) Available from: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-
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This perspective of rape as a form of male dominance and control over women is a 
macro-oriented feminist approach to examining gender-based violence and has been criticised 
for ‘failing to explain same-sex interpersonal violence… [and] ignoring the fact that women 
may also be violent within intimate relationships.’23 While we do not intend to ignore the fact 
that women as well and men can be violent, and that same-sex violence can and does occur 
frequently in both incidents of sexual and intimate relationship violence, we wish to highlight 
the fact that women are much more likely to be the victims of such crimes because they are 
women.24 It is this specific fact which brings the issue of VAW within a discussion about hate 
crime policy. Of particular concern to us is that despite many improvements in gender equality 
and criminal justice responses to gendered violence, the crime of rape remains a prevalent and 
serious issue in 21st Century Britain – one that remains underreported and, in turn, rarely 
prosecuted.25   
This article starts by critically exploring the various conceptual parallels that exist 
between rape and ‘hate crime’.26 While it is argued that many incidents of sexual violence can 
fall within criminological conceptions of hate crime, it does not necessarily follow that such 
crimes should fall within the current framework of hate crime legislation. There are myriad 
reasons why gender-based violence (such as rape) should and should not be included within 
hate crime policy/law. This article explores the pros and cons of including gender ‘hostility’ 
within what is at times a contentious policy arena. It concludes that gender ‘hostility’ should 
be included within hate crime legislation in order to recognise, and additionally combat, the 
bias nature of various forms of VAW.  
                                                          
statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/hosb1011/hosb1011?view=Binary [accessed 23rd April 2012]. 
Same-sex intimate partner violence is also common, see Hodge, n 2 above, 13. 
23 ibid, 14.  
24 ibid. 
25 The CSEW found that just one in seven victims had told the police about the incident (15 per cent). The 
detection rate for sexual offences is currently 30.0 per cent, see Ministry of Justice, An Overview of Sexual 
Offending in England and Wales (London: Ministry of Justice, Home Office & the Office for National Statistics, 
2013) 16 & 25.  See also, A. Myhill and J. Allen, Rape and Sexual Assault of Women: The Extent and Nature of 
the Problem (Home Office Research Study 237, 2002).  
26 ibid.   
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HATE CRIME: THE POLICY CONTEXT 
It has only been in the last 15 years that the term ‘hate crime’ has entered political and academic 
discourse in the UK.27 It was during this time that various high profile racist attacks and 
murders caught the attention of the media.28 The murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 was a 
particular turning point with media coverage resulting in political attention given to the needs 
of commonly victimised minority groups.29 The preponderance with ‘racist crime’, however, 
meant that policies aimed at tackling hate crime more generally were developed using what has 
now become labelled as the ‘racial animus’ model.30 This model provides that for a crime to 
become a ‘racist’ offence it must be at least partly ‘motivated’ by racial animosity towards the 
victim.31  This particular model of hate crime, common in both the US and the UK, has 
therefore dominated popular conceptions of what amounts to a ‘hate crime’. The ‘prototypical’ 
hate crime that emerged during this period depicted hate-motivated offences as those 
committed by strangers, in public spaces, without provocation, and which are usually 
accompanied by racist expletives.32   
While to a great extent this understanding of hate crime remains,33 the UK policy 
domain in this area rapidly evolved in the early part of the 21st century. The emergence of 
other identity groups’ experiences of targeted violence has meant that a more inclusive 
                                                          
27 N. Chakraborti and J. Garland, Hate Crime: Impact, Causes and Response (London: Sage Publications, 2009) 
1. The term was first coined in the US during the 1970s and 1980s in response to what appeared to be a 
growing number of prejudice-motivated crimes. See V. Jenness, ‘Engendering Hate Crime Policy: Gender, the 
“Dilemma of Difference,” and the Creation of Legal Subjects’ (2003) 2 Journal of Hate Studies 73, 75. 
28 The ‘social problem’ of racist violence had also begun to penetrate the public conscience and several Home 
Office reports highlighted the pervasiveness of such violence.  B. Bowling, Violent Racism: Victimisation, 
Policing and Social Context (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).  
29 The murder of Stephen Lawrence was followed by the subsequent Macpherson Report in 1999, Home 
Office, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, Report Cm 
4262–I,  
(1999). Various research reports into the ‘social problem’ of racist violence also provided credibility to the 
issue, see Bowling, ibid.  
30 See F.W. Lawrence, Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law (United States of America: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
31 As against other models such as the discriminatory model, which asserts that a hate crime is committed if 
the offender selects a victim because of victim’s group identity. Under this model there is no requirement that 
the offender be motivated by prejudice or animosity.  See Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 28(1)(b) for a version 
of the racial animus model of hate crime.  
32 Within the UK context see G. Mason, ‘Hate Crime and the Image of the Stranger’ (2005) 45 BJC 837; Within 
the US context see discussion by McPhail, B. A. ‘Gender-Bias Hate crimes: A Review’ (2002) 3(2) Trauma, 
Violence & Abuse 125. 
33 ibid. 
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understanding of hate crime has been developed both within academic literature and public 
policy.34 Policy guidance on the recording and prosecuting of hate crime can be found in 
various criminal justice institutions including the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), 
the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Home Office.35 They have, together, agreed a 
common definition of hate crime as:  
Any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be 
motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person's race or perceived race… 
religion or perceived religion… sexual orientation or perceived sexual 
orientation… disability or perceived disability… transgender or perceived 
transgender.36  
While this definition is used by the police and the CPS to identify hate-motivated offences, the 
current body of hate crime legislation provides a much narrower definition of hate-motivated 
offences. In fact, statutes proscribing hate crime do not use this term at all. The main criminal 
offences are contained under sections 29-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.37 Section 28 
(1) of the Act states that:  
    An offence is racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of sections 28-32 below 
If - (a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, 
the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the 
victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of racial or religious group: or  
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial 
or religious group based on their membership of that group.38  
The aggravated offences under the Act include assaults, 39  criminal damage, harassment, 
stalking and various public order offences.40 Note that these offences are only aggravated by 
                                                          
34 See Chakraborti and Garland, n 27 above, Ch 1.  
35 ibid. 
36 See for e.g., Crown Prosecution Service, Hate Crime (London: CPS, 2012) 1. This broad victim-centred 
definition is more inclusive than most other jurisdictions. It allows justice agencies to identify a high number of 
hate-based offences. However, the fact that incidents can be identified as ‘hate crimes’ by the victim or any 
other third party does not mean that the offence will be classified as a ‘hate crime’ in law, see further below.   
37 As amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 39. 
38 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 28-32. 
39 Including assault occasioning actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm, see ss 47 & 20 Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861. 
40 Including the Public Order Act 1986, s 4, 4A and 5.  
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racial or religious hostility, meaning that offences aggravated by hostilities based on other 
identity characteristics are not specifically proscribed under the Act.41  
In addition to these relatively new criminal offences are sentencing provisions 
prescribed under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.42 The provisions require a judge to treat an 
offence as ‘aggravated’ at sentencing where there is evidence to prove the offender 
demonstrated, or was (partly) motivated by, hostility based on the victims’ race, religious 
beliefs, sexual orientation, transgender and/or disability.43 These provisions apply to all types 
of offence, including sexual offences, which are committed by an offender who demonstrates 
or is (partly) motivated by hostility against one of the five protected characteristics.44 This 
means that offences such as rape can only become ‘hate crimes’ where the offender 
‘demonstrates’ hostilities or is motivated by hostilities pertaining to the victim’s race, religious 
beliefs, sexual orientation, disability or transgender status.   
The growing legislative framework on hate crime has been a key reason why hate-
motivated offences of various types have become a priority for both criminal justice agencies 
and the UK government.45 In fact England and Wales now record more ‘hate crimes’ than 
virtually any other country in the world.46 The most recently reported statistics show that there 
were 42,236 hate offences recorded by police services across the country between 2012/1347 - 
more than any other jurisdiction within the OSCE region.48 The CPS also recently reported that 
during the period of 2006/07-2010/11 the number of hate crimes referred to the CPS rose from 
                                                          
41 Though as mentioned in the Introduction to this article the Law Commission is currently reviewing whether 
the Crime and Disorder Act should be extended to include hostilities based on sexual orientation, disability and 
transgender status. See Law Commission, Hate crime: review of aggravated offences and stirring up of hatred 
offences, Consultation Paper No 213 (2013), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/hate-
crime.htm [accessed at June 24th 2013]. 
42 Or ‘presumed’ race etcetera, ss 145 & 146. 
43 See ss 145 & 146. See also ‘stirring up of hatred’ offences set out under the Public Order Act 1986, Part 3 
and Part 3A.  
44 The Public Order Act 1986 also provides for the offences of stirring up of racial religious hatred or hatred 
based on sexual orientation, Parts 3 and 3A.  
45 Chakraborti and Garland, n 27 above, xi. 
46 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region - Incidents and 
Responses: Annual Report (Poland: OSCE, 2013). The high levels of recorded hate crime is partly a result of the 
broad definition of hate crime, outlined above, but is also due to the emphasis state agencies have put on 
tackling hate crimes post Macpherson.   
47 Ministry of Justice, An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (Home Office, Office for National 
Statistics and Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
48 See Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Hate Crime Laws - A Practical Guide 
(OSCE, 2009). 
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14,133 to 15,519.49 Clearly then, a great deal of time and resources are being spent on tackling 
the high number of hate crimes committed each year in England and Wales. 
The purpose of hate crime legislation is to increase the amount of protection offered to 
specific groups while providing a potential remedy to the victimisation and fear that many 
group members experience when a hate crime occurs.50 Within our retributive system of justice, 
the enhanced penalties which the legislative provisions provide for not only act as an important 
tool for recognising the enhanced harms caused by hate crime incidents,51 but also provide for 
state-expressed denunciation52 (as described in more detail later in this article).  On this basis, 
it is our view that hate-motivated offences should be pursued by the state specifically as ‘hate 
crimes’.53 
 
GENDERED VIOLENCE AND THE HATE CRIME MODEL: POWER, RISK, 
VULNERABILITY, AND ENHANCED HARM 
 
Although absent in the UK context, several US based scholars have argued that certain 
gendered crimes should fit within the hate crime paradigm.54 This is because crimes that are 
specifically directed against women are also likely to carry with them a demonstration, or (part) 
motivation, of hostility that is based on the victim’s gender. In illustrating the hate dynamics 
of gendered violence several academics have referred to the case of Marc Lepiné – a young 
man who killed 14 female students at a university in Montreal, Canada. Jane Caputi and Diana 
Russell provide a chilling account of this case:  
25 year-old combat magazine aficionado Marc Lepiné suited up for war... rushed 
the school of engineering. In one classroom, he separated the women from the 
men, ordered the men out, and, shouting, ‘You’re all fucking feminists,’ opened 
fire on the women. During a half-hour rampage, Lepiné killed 14 young women, 
wounded 9 other women and 4 men, and then turned the gun on himself. A three-
                                                          
49 Crown Prosecution Service, Hate Crime and Crimes against Older People Report 2010-2011 (London: CPS, 
2012). 
50 See P. Iganski, ‘Why Make “Hate” a Crime?’ (1999) 19 Critical Social Policy 386. 
51 ibid. 
52 See M. Walters, ‘Conceptualising ‘Hostility’ for Hate Crime Law: Minding ‘the Minutiae’ When Interpreting 
Section 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2013) OJLS 1, doi: 10.1093/ojls/gqt021. 
53 See further explication of the justification, and role of, hate crime legislation below.   
54 Rothschild; Gaffney; Carney n 20 above.  
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page suicide note blamed all of his failures on women, whom he felt had rejected 
him and scorned him. Also found on his body was a hit list of 15 prominent 
Canadian women.55  
 
Lepiné’s victims were shot solely on the basis that they were female, the victims had no 
previous relationship with the attacker, and they were, for all intents and purposes, 
interchangeable objects who were selected because of a hatred Lepiné felt towards women. 
Gender-based crimes, such as Lepiné’s offences, could fit within the UK hate crime model 
with little contestation if the provisions were to include gender as a protected characteristic. In 
this case Lepiné was clearly motivated by hostility towards his victims’ gender identity. His 
actions would also clearly fall within the meaning of ‘demonstrates’ used in both the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003.56   
More recently in the UK on the 25 February 2008, Levi Bellfield was convicted of the 
murder of two young women and the attempted murder of a third.57 Prior to these convictions, 
Mr Bellfield had been charged with false imprisonment, attempted murder and abduction of 
women, and in 2010 he was charged with the murder and abduction of Milly Dowler, who was 
13 years old at the time of the incident.58 Bellfield’s list of violence against women is believed 
to be even longer, with police suggesting that he may have been responsible for around 20 
unsolved crimes against women, including rape.59During the sentencing of Bellfield for the 
murder of Milly Dowler, the judge described Bellfield’s attacks to be the result of ‘unreasoning 
hatred’ towards women.  Police and media reports described how he hated blonde women in 
particular. Acquaintances spoke of his intense loathing of women who had dyed blond hair, 
calling them ‘sluts’, ‘impure’ and who ‘deserved to be messed around with’.  A former 
                                                          
55 J. Caputi and D. Russell, ‘Femicide: Sexist Terrorism Against Women’ in J. Radford and D.E.H. Russell (eds), 
Femicide: The Politics of Women Killing (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992) 13. 
56 A ‘demonstration’ of hostility is much easier to prove and does not require the courts to examine the 
offender’s motives. Such cases are usually proved using evidence of identity-based slurs uttered during the 
commission of an offence. See E. Burney and G. Rose, Racist offences: How is the law working? The 
implementation of the legislation on racially aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (London: 
Home Office Research, Development, and Statistics Directorate, 2002). 
57 BBC ‘Levi Bellfield Guilty of Milly Dowler Murder’ (23 June 2011)  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-13875507 
[accessed 5 September 2013] 
58 ibid. See C. Davies ‘Levi Bellfield gets life without parole’ (The Guardian, 24 June 2011) 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jun/24/levi-bellfield-life-without-parole  
[accessed 5 September 2013] 
59 See Davies, ibid.  
11 
 
girlfriend of his even said that he would hang around in alleyways waiting for women to walk 
by and feel an urge to want to ‘hurt them, and stab them.’60  
Bellfield’s crimes, like Lepinés, were clearly motivated by hostility towards his victims’ 
gender.  This begs the question, why have crimes such as Levi Bellfield’s, been left outside of 
UK hate crime policy? Before we discuss why this might be, we should look further into 
whether other types of ‘gendered violence’ could fall within legal and criminological 
conceptions of ‘hate crime’.  For the purposes of illustration and space and for the reasons 
mentioned in the introduction of this article we focus, in the main, on the offence of rape.  
The extant literature on the crime of rape has not only uncovered its deleterious harms 
but sociologists and social-psychologists have also helpfully explored its aetiology.61 Feminist 
scholars have long asserted that rape is an expression of power and control over women.62 A 
long history of female subordination has been perpetually reinforced by social and structural 
processes that support male domination.63  Rape has been, and still is, frequently used to 
subjugate women.  Psychological research on convicted rapists has shown that offenders 
frequently feel anger towards women which manifests in a need to control or dominate them.64  
Nicholas Groths’ famous typology of rape suggests that there are two main motivating factors 
involved in the crime of rape.65 The first is called ‘power rape’ and refers to ‘sexual intercourse 
as evidence of conquest’.66 Dominance is achieved by overpowering women, thus (re)asserting 
male authority. A female victim is in effect forced to submit to her male captor. The second 
type of rape is termed ‘anger rape’ and is explained by reference to the ‘anger, rage, contempt, 
and hatred’ that is expressed by the offender beating his victim and/or forcing her to submit to 
degrading sexual acts.67  This form of rape uses the physical act to subordinate women’s 
                                                          
60 ibid.  
61 See for e.g. K. Drieschner and A. Lange, ‘A review of cognitive factors in the etiology of rape: theories, 
empirical studies, and implications’ (1999) 19 Clinical Psychology Review 57; T. A. Gannon and T. Ward, ‘Rape: 
Psychopathology and theory’ in D. R. Laws and W.T. O’Donohue (eds), Sexual Deviance: Theory, Assessment, 
and Treatment (New York: A Division of Guildford Publications, Inc, 2008).  
62 See e.g. Brownmiller, n 12 above.  
63 See for e.g. Brownmiller, n 12 above; Perry, n 14 above; K. Kirsh-Ashman and G.H. Hull, Understanding 
Generalist Practise (Belmont: Thomas Brook/Cole, 2006); Hodge, n 2 above. 
64 D. Lisak and R. Roth, ‘Motivational factors in nonincarcerated sexually aggressive men’ (1988) 55(5) J Pers 
Soc Psychol 795. Despite such findings Hodge notes that many people remain convinced that sexual violence is 
motivated, not by power or misogyny, but by a desire for instant sexual gratification, Hodge, n 2 above. 
Though it should be noted that some scholars have maintained that rape is caused by sexual gratification 
rather than power, see J. Tedeschi and R. B. Felson, Violence, Aggression, and Coercive Actions (American 
Psychological Association, 1994). 
65 N. Groth, Men Who Rape: The Psychology of the Offender (New York: Plenum Press, 1979). 
66 C. A. Wicktom, ‘Focusing on the Offender’s Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws’ 
(1998) 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 399, 400.  
67 ibid.  
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sexuality and identity, ensuring that men’s sexuality remains dominant, powerful and superior. 
68 Rape as a form of bodily violence can therefore be characterised as a process of subjugation 
which keeps women in ‘their place’,69  or more precisely as Susan Miller70  asserts, as an 
expression of misogyny.71 As with other forms of prejudice, misogyny can be described as a 
type of hatred of women, or within the legal lexicon gender-based ‘hostility’.72 Men are taught 
to harbour gender animus as a result of their socialisation process, and in the context of 
structural power relations between men and women, learn to see – and denigrate – women as 
inherently inferior. 73  This process involves the propagation of negative stereotypes and 
expectations about women and their sexual roles and in the case of rape can lead to attitudes of 
victim-blaming towards rape victims, as well as ‘rape myths’ which serve to justify why men 
seek to exercise violent sexual power over women.74  
 
Parallels of impact 
 
Rape is a violation both of the body and mind, and as such many women experience immense 
psychological and physical harms.75  As we have already alluded to above, rape is a crime 
which remains omnipresent throughout society.76  According to recent data from the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) there was an estimated 366,000 – 442,000 sexual 
offences committed against women in the last year.77 During 2011/12 the police recorded 
53,665 sexual offences, of which 14,767 were rapes of a female, and 1,274 were rapes of a 
male.78 The disproportionate number of sexual offences committed against women has meant 
that gender has been considered a ‘risk factor’.79 The risk of sexual violence (and others forms 
                                                          
68 Groths’ research found that most rapists were actually blends of power and anger motivations, meaning that 
the feelings of anger are often associated with the desire to control women. Groth, n 65 above.  
69 Brownmiller, n 12 above. 
70 S. Miller, ‘Gender-Motivated Hate Crimes: A Question of Misogyny’ in D.J. Curran and C. Renzetti (eds), 
Contemporary Societies : Problems nd Prospects (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994) 231. 
71 While Hodge states that they are ‘misogynistic acts of violence’, Hodge, n 2 above, 31.  
72 D. D. Gilmore, Misogyny: The Male Malady (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).  
73 Gaffney, n 20 above, 264. 
74 ibid, 264-268; McPhail, n 32 above, 132.  
75 Kelly et al., n 3 above, 11. Harms often include physical injury, STIs, depression, alcoholism and suicide, 
WHO, n 6 above. 
76 Westmarland and Gangoli, n 2 above, 1. 
77 Ministry of Justice, n 25 above. 
78 Chaplin et al, n 22 above.  
79 L. Heise, ‘International Dimensions of Violence Against Women’ (1989) 12 Response to the Victimisation of 
Women and Children 3, 6. 
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of gendered violence) is exacerbated by both its persistent and repetitive nature.80 For example, 
Andy Myhill and Jonathan Allen’s analysis of British Crime Survey data back in 2002 found 
that 41 per cent of women who reported sexual victimisation experienced more than one 
incident.81 Multiple victimisation is common at the hands of both current and ex-partners.82 
The often repeated nature of much sexual violence is, in many respects, similar to other 
types of hate crime. In relation to racist violence, Benjamin Bowling notes that incidents cannot 
be ‘reducible to an isolated incident, or even a collection of incidents,’83 but rather they are 
likely to make a process of structural and personal experiences of violence, which is the result 
of their racial background.84  Mark Walters and Carolyn Hoyle have also highlighted the 
repeated nature of hate crime via their research into community mediation.85 They found that 
many of the cases that they researched ‘could be characterized as long-term targeted hate abuse’ 
which were committed by people known to the offenders.86 The ‘process of victimisation’ 
uncovered by researchers examining both hate crime and gendered violence provide evidence 
of the similarities between these discrete forms of crime. Such findings counter the outdated 
perception that both types of violence are committed by deranged strangers in dark alleyways.  
The consequences of (repeated) rape and other types of hate crime are also comparable. 
Both types of victimisation have far-reaching individual and social implications which can 
have long lasting impacts.87 For instance, researchers have highlighted high levels of what has 
been termed ‘rape trauma syndrome’ amongst survivors of sexual violence.88 This is where 
victims experience symptoms of emotional trauma, such as anxiety, depression or post-
traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) as they relive their experience over and over again in their 
mind.89 Post-traumatic stress disorder is also common amongst victims of domestic violence 
                                                          
80 Romkens & Letschert also note that ‘a substantial proportion of domestic violence is not limited to single 
incidents, but develops into patterns of repeated violations, R. Römkens and R. Letschert, Feasibility Study For 
A Convention Against Domestic Violence, European Committee On Crime Problems (Strasbourg: European 
Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), 2007) 6 at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/rossrights/docs/pdfs/DVfeasibility.pdf [accessed 24 June 2013]. 
81 Myhill & Allen, n 25.  
82 ibid, 3.  
83 Bowling, n 28 above, 230. 
84 See also M. Walters and C. Hoyle, ‘Exploring the Everyday World of Hate Victimisation through community 
mediation’ (2012) 18 International Review of Victimology 7. 
85 ibid.  
86 Often as neighbours, but also ex-friends, ibid, 7. 
87 See for example, Myhill & Allen, n 25 above; Smith et al, n 10 above. 
88 This is a psychological condition which relates to the severe disruptions to an individual’s physical, 
emotional, and behavioural characteristics.  See J. Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 4. 
89 Carney, n 20 above, 345. 
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who often live in constant fear of retaliation if they confront their abusers.90 The psychological 
damage caused by both sexual and domestic violence will in some cases lead to suicidal 
ideation and actions amongst victims.91  
The emotional experiences of survivors of rape are in many ways similar to those who 
experience hate crime victimisation. Although the sexual nature of much gendered violence is 
different in nature to a physical racist assault, many of the psychological impacts are strikingly 
similar.92  For example, Paul Iganski’s analysis of British Crime Survey data in 2008 found 
that victims of racist hate crime were more likely to report experiencing feelings of anxiety, 
shock, depression and feelings of vulnerability, when compared to victims of similar but non-
hate motivated crimes.93 Similarly, Herek et al’s research in the US found that victims of 
homophobic hate crimes were more likely to experience emotional harms such as anxiety and 
depression for extended periods of time beyond that which is experienced by victims of similar 
but non-hate motivated crimes.94 The enhanced traumas caused by hate crime can be partly 
explained by the fact that such incidents attack a victim’s individual identity. Every hate crime 
conveys a symbolic message to both the victim and others like him or her. It expresses disdain 
for the victim’s identity traits and, as such, actively undermines the victim’s social worth within 
the community.95 Victims of hate crime will know that they have been attacked, not because 
of what they have done, but because of what they look like, what they believe in, or who they 
are sexually attracted to. 96   
The symbolic nature of hate crime means that other members of the victim’s group are 
likely to fear that they too will be targeted.97  Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi refer to this as the 
                                                          
90 See L. Jones, L. M. Hughes and U. Unterstaller, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Victims of Domestic 
Violence: A Review of the Research’ (2001) 2 Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 99. 
91 WHO, n 6 above, 24. 
92 It should be noted that many hate crimes are of a sexual nature. See K. Allerfeldt, Crime and the Rise of 
Modern America: A History from 1865-1941 (New York: Routledge, 2011). The ‘corrective’ rapes of lesbians as 
a means of turning them heterosexual, or the sexual penetration of gay men with various damaging objects as 
a way of injuring them have been documented as forms of hate crime. See B. Watermeyer, Towards a 
Contextual Psychology of Disabilism (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).  
93 P. Iganski, Hate Crime and the City (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2008), 12, 13, 82 & 83. See also Ministry of 
Justice, n 47 above; G.M. Herek, J.R. Gillis, J.C. Cogan and E.K. Glunt, ‘Hate crime Victimisation among Lesbian, 
Gay and Bisexual Adults’ (1997) 12 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 195; J. McDevitt, J. Balboni, L. Garcia and 
J. Gu, ‘Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias- Motivated Assaults’ (2001) 45 American 
Behavioural Scientist 697; P.  
94 Herek et al, ibid. 
95 ibid. 
96 The highly damaging individual effects of sexual violence and hate crime is one of the main reasons why 
legislators have enacted enhanced penalties for these types of crime (See for example, Lawrence, n 30 above). 
97 ibid; McPhail, n 32 above. 
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‘in terrorem’ effect of hate crime, as hate-motivated incidents act to terrorise whole 
communities. 98  The constant fear of targeted victimisation leads to many minority group 
members changing the way that they act in order to fit in, thus avoiding victimisation.99 For 
many, this also means avoiding certain locations and even staying at home during certain times 
when they feel at greatest risk.100  
It is unsurprising then that violence targeted specifically towards women is also likely 
to have the effect of instilling fear in other women that they too will be victimised.101 Carole 
Sheffield describes rape as a form of ‘sexual terrorism,’ arguing that it is: 
...manifested through actual and implied violence; and all females, irrespective of 
race, class, physical or mental abilities, and sexual orientation, are potential victims 
– at any age, at any time, or in any place. 102 
Under Sheffield’s construction of sexual terrorism then, rape and other processes of violence 
directed against women are used to keep women in a state of fear, 103 much in the same way 
that violence directed towards gay and lesbian people, religious groups and racial minorities 
work to keep them in ‘their place’. Perpetrators of rape just like other ‘traditional’ hate crime 
offenders act ‘out, in violent form, a relationship of prejudice which permeates our society’.104 
Susan Griffin asserts that regardless of whether a woman has experienced the direct act of rape, 
every woman in society is a victim because ‘rape and the fear of rape are a daily part of every 
woman’s consciousness’.105  Indeed, some have even considered the rape of a woman in 
today’s society to be comparable to the lynching of African-Americans before it was 
                                                          
98 B, Perry and S. Alvi, ‘“We are all vulnerable”: the in terrorem effects of hate crimes’ (2012) 18 International 
Review of Victimology 57; see also M. Noelle, ‘The Ripple Effect of the Matthew Shepherd Murder: Impact on 
the Assumptive Worlds of Members of the Targeted Group’ (2002) 46 American Behavioural Scientist 27. 
99 It is important to note that hate crime laws offer protection to people of any religion, race, sexual 
orientation, regardless of whether the individual is a member of a minority group or not (see for example, 
McPhail, n 32 above).  Hate crime law and policy does not specify that the victim must be a member of a 
minority group (see R v White [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1352).  Therefore, while men and women are not minorities’ 
numerically, they would both be protected by hate crime laws if gender were to be included as a protected 
category under current hate crime legislation. 
100 See Iganski, n 93 above. 
101 Hodge, n 2 above, 3.  
102 C.J. Sheffield, ‘Hate Violence’ in P.S. Rothenberg (ed), Race, Class, and Gender in the United States: An 
Integrated Study (New York: St Martins, 1995) 393.  
103 ibid. 
104 Rothschild, n 20 above, 262-263. 
105 S. Griffin, ‘Rape: The All-American Crime’ (1971) 10 Ramparts 26, 27.  
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recognised as a civil rights violation.106  That is because rape is the ultimate physical threat; 
what Susan Brownmiller famously expressed as the ‘conscious process of intimation by which 
all men keep all women in a state of fear’.107 It thereby re-enforces a social hierarchy where 
women are subordinate to men – just as lynching was historically used to keep black people in 
a state of intimidation thus ensuring that white people remained socially and culturally 
dominant.108    
 
The vexing issue of interchangeability 
 
One reason why rape and other forms of gendered violence have fallen outside of the hate crime 
paradigm is that most victims are known to their offender – often intimately.109 It has been 
asserted that hate crimes under UK legislation differ from other crimes because the choice of 
victim by the perpetrator is based on their membership of a particular group, such as their race 
or religion, which suggests that ‘one member of such a group is interchangeable with any 
other’.110 One argument against the inclusion of rape or domestic violence in hate crime laws 
is that the victim of these crimes are not necessarily interchangeable in the same way other 
victims of hate crimes might be.111 This is of particular salience in the case of intimate or 
acquaintance rape where the victim and offender are already known to each other.112 Research 
in England and Wales has shown that females are more likely to be raped by males who know 
them in some way, usually acquaintances or partners,113 with stranger rapes accounting for just 
10 per cent of all rapes.114As such, most rape victims are not interchangeable in the same way 
that most other hate crime victims are. This means that the majority of rapes do not seem to 
match the necessary characteristics of a ‘conventional’ hate crime. 115   This has led Eric 
Rothschild to argue that only specific types of rape, such as stranger rape, should be considered 
                                                          
106 ibid; M. Angelari, ‘Hate Crime Statues: A Promising Tool for Fighting Violence Against Women’ (1994) 2 
Journal of Gender and the Law 64; Carney, n 20 above.  
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as ‘hate crimes’. 116   The reasoning put forward for this is that these are the only types of rape 
were the victim is truly interchangeable, i.e. the selection of the victim is based on their gender 
rather than because of other interpersonal factors.117   
Rothschild’s argument is, however, to a large extent flawed. The simple fact that a 
personal relationship exists between offender and victim does not preclude an incident from 
being understood as an expression of identity-based hatred.   Central to whether an offence 
amounts to a ‘hate crime’ is whether the offender demonstrates hostility towards the victim 
based on the victim’s identity traits and not whether the victim can be interchanged. Recent 
research has begun to illuminate the interpersonal relationships that develop between 
individuals before hate incidents occur.118 In particular the close (faux) friendships which are 
often formed prior to the commission of disablist hate crime have led some to refer to such 
victimisation as ‘mate crimes’.119  In a similar strain, the fact that rapes frequently occur 
between people known to each other120 must not preclude them from being understood as being 
motivated by gender hostility.121  Indeed, the growing tendency to view intimate rapes as a 
problem that exists between individual men and their relationships with women potentially 
‘renders the gendered aspect invisible and obscures any focus on wider issues of misogyny.’122  
Even if we were to accept interchangeability as a prerequisite for hate crime, this should 
still not preclude rape or domestic violence from being classified as being potentially 
aggravated by gender hostility. This is because victims of acquaintance/intimate rapes or 
domestic violence may well be interchangeable in the minds of their attackers.123 Although the 
victim is not selected randomly she will be interchangeable in the sense that the offender will 
express gender hostility towards any woman that he becomes intimately involved with. 
Statistics already highlighted above show that gendered violence is often repeated over 
prolonged periods of time, with offenders abusing and raping women they know because they 
                                                          
116 Rothschild, n 20 above. 
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are women.124 Such violence is therefore not directed at the victim as an ‘individual’ but is way 
of subordinating women per se.125  
Interchangeability is not only reflected in the minds of offenders but can be symbolised 
in the group response to gendered violence.  Kathryn Carney argues that when women hear 
about a rape many experience a heightened sense of vulnerability, fearing that they too could 
be raped. 126  It is these widespread feelings of vulnerability felt by an entire community of 
women that signify the interchangeable nature of rape.127  Additionally, the belief that women 
are not interchangeable in the way that other hate crime victims are, ignores the fact that many 
women take considerable steps to alter their lifestyles in order to avoid victimisation, ‘precisely 
because they are aware of their vulnerability.’128 Gender-bias crimes therefore affect women 
as a group; similar to the way attacking someone who is lesbian or gay affects lesbian and gay 
communities.129 This means that although women are not a minority group numerically, their 
marginalisation by men leaves them ‘minoritised’ in a similar way to that which numerical 
minority groups experience.130  
 
WHY INCLUDE GENDER ‘HOSTILITY’? THE IMPORTANCE OF CENSURE 
 
It is clear thus far that many crimes committed against women fit within current conceptions 
of hate crime. However, it does not automatically follow that crimes such as rape should be 
brought within the policy domain of hate crime. Just because an offence may fit within our 
comprehension of what ‘hate’ might entail does not necessarily mean it is advantageous to 
include it within hate crime law. There are many hate-motivated crimes – caused by prejudice 
which result in enhanced levels of harm – which are not included within current hate crime 
policies. Crimes motivated by hostilities against the elderly or incidents which are directed 
against individuals belonging to certain subcultures, while arguably about identity-based 
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prejudice, remain outside state-led policies aimed at tackling ‘hate crime.’131 There are various 
reasons for inclusion/exclusion which extend beyond whether an offence can fall within the 
meaning of ‘hate’ or ‘hostility’. Before we examine these reasons it is helpful to give further 
consideration to some of the justifications for hate crime legislation. It is beyond the scope of 
this article to examine all the rationales that have been given for hate crime legislation – indeed 
the arguments for and against such legislation are well rehearsed within hate crime 
scholarship.132 Nevertheless one rationale in particular requires further elucidation if we are to 
determine whether ‘gender’ should be included under hate crime legislation – that of expressed 
denunciation.  
Laws that specifically criminalise hate-motivated crimes are an attempt to protect those 
groups which have historically experienced disproportionate levels of targeted abuse.133 The 
law is used, not only as recognition of the enhanced levels of harm that such incidents cause 
(as described above),134 but as an important source of state-expressed denunciation.135 The 
messages contained within hate incidents are, in turn, met with the symbolic messages of the 
law. It is asserted that the power of the law will deter future incidents of hate crime by helping 
to shape positive social mores – those which reject prejudice-motivated behaviours.136  Iganski 
asserts that hate crime laws: 
... provide an important declaratory purpose aimed at the individuals who might offend in the 
unfolding context of their everyday lives, either when the opportunity presents itself or a 
provocation occurs.137 
                                                          
131 Note that subculture has recently been added to some police service’s definition of hate crime. While this 
means that subculture has recently entered the policy domain it does not exist within the legal framework of 
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While it is unlikely that hate crime legislation will deter the ‘unthinking racist’ who lashes 
out in the ‘heat of the moment’,138 the criminalisation of racially motivated offences when 
combined with a criminal justice apparatus specifically designed to tackle hate crime,139 
is likely to deter at least some people from committing hate crime.140  
The law clearly has an important role in shaping the ways in which society thinks about 
certain forms of victimisation.141 We believe this to be especially the case considering the 
fact that state has itself been guilty of proliferating practices, policies and laws which 
have historically supported social environments through which hate crimes have 
thrived.142 We need only remind ourselves of the example of legal exemption to marital 
rape, mentioned in the introduction to this article, to reflect on how the law has been used 
to justify the subjugation and oppression of women through violence. Other forms of 
targeted abuse have also emerged as a direct result of state practices and laws which have 
at their heart the subjugation of certain identity groups. The introduction of slavery and 
racial segregation are but two historical examples of the use of state power to repress 
certain minority groups. In more modern times the use of anti-terrorism legislation and 
government policies on state security have arguably resulted in anger and anxieties 
directed towards Muslim communities, and in turn to hate crime.143 Iganski is apt to 
reflect that: 
…if the state plays an important role in providing an environment in which ‘hate 
crime’ can flourish, the state can therefore also potentially play a role in eroding 
that environment. 
Key to this article is the question of whether the inclusion of gender within hate crime law will 
help to ‘erode’ the patriarchal environment144  which supports the acceptance of gendered 
violence and the culture of blame attached to its victims. In order to answer this question it is 
instructive for us to examine the declaratory power of current offences aimed at tackling VAW. 
We use again the offence of rape as a particularly salient example of the use of the law to tackle 
gendered violence.  
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The law on sexual offences was vastly overhauled 10 years ago under the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003.145 Wide sweeping changes were made as a response to the old law being 
perceived as ‘archaic, incoherent, and discriminatory.’146 In particular, greater clarification of 
the concept of ‘consent’ was required while gender neutrality was necessary if the law was to 
limit gender discrimination within this area of law. Moreover, changes in both law and policy 
were needed in order to encourage victims to report sexual offences in an attempt at 
increasing official detections.147 Section one of the Sexual Offence Act 2003 now defines 
rape in England and Wales as an offence where the defendant ‘intentionally penetrates the 
vagina, anus or mouth of another person with his penis’ without consent and where the 
defendant does not reasonably believe that the victim consents.  Rape is therefore now gender 
specific in terms of perpetration and gender neutral in terms of victimisation.148   
Prior to the 2003 Act, significant amendments had been made to the law on rape in the 
1970s and 1990s.149  The inclusion of marital rape was incorporated into the common law in 
1991150 and male rape was introduced into the statutory framework in 1994,151 while a new 
limitation on the use of sexual history evidence was enacted under section 41 of the Youth and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999.152 However, although there have been many advances in law, 
procedure and practice,153 problems still remain with the current legislative framework.154  
Baroness Stern in her review into how rape complaints are handled by public authorities 
observed that the policies and laws that are now enacted onto the statute books are the ‘rights 
ones’, however the real failure remains with the implementation of such laws. 155 Of significant 
concern is that there remains a stubbornly high attrition rate.156  Attrition refers to the numbers 
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and percentage of rape cases that do not end up reaching court or result in a guilty verdict.  
Even if rape is reported to the police, the case may not be recorded as a crime or proceed to 
court.157  A large number of cases ‘drop out’ of the process before reaching trial, and for these 
women the sense of injustice can be victimising itself.158  Research has suggested that the high 
attrition rate may be partly due to the way in which criminal justice practitioners respond to 
complaints.159 Stern notes that “There is a long history of disbelief, disrespect, blaming the 
victim, not seeing rape as a serious violation, and therefore deciding not to record it as a 
crime”.160 While there have been vast improvements in this regard, there remains an extensive 
body of empirical evidence to suggest that many justice practitioners and members of the public 
continue to view rape victims as partly to blame for their own victimisation.161  According to 
a study carried out by Amnesty International 26 per cent of the respondents believed that if a 
woman was wearing provocative or sexy clothing, then she was totally or partially responsible 
for being raped. 162     
Of equal concern is that out of the relatively small number of perpetrators that do face 
prosecution, an even smaller number end up facing conviction.163 Currently the conviction rate 
remains low at 6.5 per cent.164 The reasons why cases do not result in a conviction have been 
linked to both individual and institutionalised misconceptions of rape, such as stereotypes, bias 
and prejudice towards the alleged rape victim – all of which are gendered.165 A number of 
studies have shown that the acceptance of ‘rape myths’ remains prevalent amongst members 
of the public (and jurors); such as that ‘real rape’ is committed by a stranger.166 Such beliefs 
                                                          
157 Stern, n 155 above. 
158 K. Cook, ‘Rape Investigation and Prosecution: Stuck in the Mud?’ (2011) 17 Journal of Sexual Aggression 
250.  
159 Temkin and Krahé, n 152 above. 
160 Stern, n 155 above, 14.  
161 See for eg. Temkin and Krahé, n 152 above.  
162 Amnesty International, Sexual Assault Research Summary Report (UK: AIUK, 2005) 7. See also, S. Bieneck & 
B. Krahé, ‘Blaming victims and exonerating the perpetrator in cases of rape and robbery: Is there a double 
standard?’ 26 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1785. 
163 Horvath and Brown, n 153 above. 
164 Stern, n 155 above. 
165 Temkin and Krahé, n 152 above. 
166 For an overview see, ibid; E. Suarez & T.M. Gadalla, ‘Stop Blaming the Victim: A Meta-Analysis on Rape 
Myths’ (2010) 25 J Interpers Violence 2010; See also, A. Grubb & J. Harrower, ‘Understanding attribution of 
blame in cases of rape: An analysis of participant gender, type of rape and perceived similarity to the victim’ 
(2009) 15 Journal of Sexual Aggression 63; L. Maddox, D. Lee & C. Barker, ‘The Impact of Psychological 
Consequences of Rape on Rape Case Attrition: The Police Perspective’ (2012) 27 Journal of Police and Criminal 
Psychology 33. Though there is some evidence to suggest that relationship rape is now more commonly 
imagined, A.L Ellison & V.E Munro, ‘Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room? Critical Reflections 
Upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study’ (2010) 13 New Criminal Law Review 
781. For a comparative analysis indicating that the percentage of people who hold negative attitudes towards 
23 
 
reinforce inaccurate understandings about the reality of rape and affect how rape is understood 
and treated within the criminal justice system.167 Other common ‘rape myths’ identified by 
researchers include: the belief that a prior sexual relationship with the alleged perpetrator 
implies consent, intoxicated women want to be raped168 – or are at least to blame for their 
rape169 – false allegations of rape are common,170 ‘rape is an expression of sexual desire’,171 
and that a real rape victim will tell someone immediately about the incident. 172  These 
misconceptions, as well as negative attitudes towards rape victims, can undermine the 
credibility of the rape complaint, increase the police’s propensity to ‘no-crime’ rape 
complaints173 and therefore hinder the chances of a conviction.174   
What these studies tell us is that legislation aimed at tackling sexual violence has yet to 
effectively challenge the high levels of rape committed against women or the negative social 
attitudes surrounding rape victims.175   It is likely that ‘rape myths’ and ‘rape myth acceptance’ 
continue to blight the successful prosecution of many rape offenders.176 One might therefore 
assert that the problem is not with the law on rape, or the punitiveness of the statutory 
provisions, but with the social attitudes that continue to dictate that women are at least partly 
to blame for their experiences of victimisation. Paradoxically, what might seem to be a 
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powerful statement of law (i.e. the Sexual Offences Act 2003), an Act which aims to 
strenuously challenge sexual violence, is to a certain extent frustrated by socially ingrained 
attitudes that continue to dictate that women are largely to blame for their own experiences of 
sexual violence, or that rape rather than being an expression of power is simply due to men’s 
low levels of self-control and their inability to suppress their own desires for sexual 
gratification. Clearly then, the acceptance of ‘rape myths’ when combined with criminal justice 
practitioners’ ignorance about the nature of gendered violence, means that the criminal justice 
system continues to lack sufficient bite to effectively combat this type of crime.177   
There are questions here around what possibilities exist within the law if it is 
continuously thwarted by the pervasive misogynistic beliefs which underlie its 
operationalization. Within the criminal process various efforts have been made to address the 
continuing issue of ‘rape myths’,178 including providing new jury directions and providing 
information packs for juries.179 Others have also called for the use of expert evidence to dispel 
myths.180 Outside of the criminal process, calls for greater public education on what amounts 
to rape have also garnered much support,181 while better public engagement via third sector 
agencies may help to prevent rather than cure the problem of VAW.182  
We believe that all of these strategies will play a significant role in addressing gendered 
violence. However, the law must simultaneously remain a means through which the state 
effectively challenges such behaviours. One way in which rape, and potentially other types of 
gendered violence, can be re-framed is through the law of hate crime. By including gender 
identity within hate crime legislation, many offences of rape would be understood, not just as 
acts of sexual abuse, but as acts of prejudice used against women to oppress, subordinate and 
control them. 183   Such a reorientation of causation could help to diminish the perceived 
‘responsibility’ of victims by shifting emphasis onto the offender’s wrongful, immoral and 
discriminatory conduct.184  There is the potential, therefore, for hate crime law to directly 
challenge those ‘rape myths’ that continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Sexual 
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Offences Act 2003. 185  For instance, in the case of acquaintance rape where the rape 
complainant knows the offender, or where the victim has dressed in a ‘provocative’ way, or 
perhaps even initiated non-intercourse intimacy, police and prosecutors may not see any point 
in building the case due to a disbelief and/or lack of credibility towards the complainant; despite 
these factors having little bearing on whether the victim consented or not.186 By focusing on 
the violent conduct of the offender and his motive – i.e. to penetrate the victim’s vagina, mouth 
or anus without her consent while demonstrating hostility against her gender – the legal system 
may well become less interested in the victim’s conduct and the ‘artificial circumstance of the 
relationship between rapist and victim.’187  Angelari additionally notes that the benefit of 
‘focusing on the hatred involved in violence against women… [is that] treating violence against 
women as a hate crime may direct emphasis away from the sexual nature of certain bias 
motivated acts of violence against women, such as rape.’188 An important step would be to 
‘divorce sex from rape where possible’189 and therefore potentially eradicate the myth that rape 
is the result of a misguided sexual desire.190 
This article asserts that the additional label of hate crime in some cases of sexual 
violence could help to challenge the myths that surround rapes and rape complainants by ‘by 
telling society that rape is a crime that occurs not because a woman asked for it or deserved it, 
but because of her gender’.191 This is not to say that rape (or other types of gendered crimes) 
should be relabelled wholesale as ‘hate crime’. Rather, certain offences such as rape or 
domestic violence could, in certain circumstances, become labelled additionally as ‘hate 
crime’.192 Just as racially aggravated assault is a crime of assault which is aggravated by racial 
hostility, so might the crime of rape be aggravated by gender hostility. In turn this could 
improve rape conviction rates by revealing the biased nature of many sexual offences, helping 
to dispel ‘rape myths’ and supporting the long held belief that gendered violence is a crime of 
prejudice against women.    
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Notwithstanding the arguments in favour of additional censure for rape offenders, one 
might remain sceptical about the denunciatory power of the law in relation to the crime of rape 
considering the stigma that is already attached to this offence. As Rothschild193 notes: 
While anecdotal evidence suggests that a hate crime conviction is the first thing a 
defendant wants plea bargained off his record when subject to prosecution for 
assault or battery, it is not clear that the threat of such a conviction on a rapists 
record will add much incremental deterrence in relation to the already significant 
censure which will accompany the label of rapist.  
 
However, questions about whether the additional stigma of ‘hate’ will have any deterrent effect 
on individual offenders are less important to us than the impacts that it may have on broadly 
held social attitudes towards rape perpetrators and victims. Indeed most research indicates that 
increasing criminal sanctions has little direct impact on crime rates.194 Rather it is the potential 
for longer term norm creation which is of greatest significance. An important purpose of hate 
crime law is to shape social mores by policing the boundaries of acceptable behaviour.195 While 
it may be the case that many people believe that rape is a gendered crime, this is not necessarily 
a view held by the majority of people and therefore enhancing the punishment for some rape 
offenders under the hate crime label could ‘serve as a legal imprimatur on the definition of 
rape’.196 In this sense, reframing some incidents of gendered violence as being about ‘hate’ 
could empower victims by shifting blame away from them and onto their offenders and thus 
helping to validate their experiences.197 Such relabeling may help to encourage victims to 
report rapes, by incrementally improving the perception that their experiences will be taken 
seriously both by criminal justice practitioners and other members of the community.198  
The failure to include the option for ‘gender aggravated’ rape under UK hate crime 
legislation ignores the evidence that rape affects women collectively as a group, similar to those 
groups currently included under hate crime laws.199  Furthermore, exclusion may actually 
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perpetrate the myths surrounding why men choose to rape women.200 In other words, the state’s 
refusal to acknowledge gendered violence as gendered ‘hostility’ may actually send an 
unintended counter message that gendered crimes are not gendered at all.  This, in turn, feeds 
directly into misogynistic beliefs about women being partly to blame for their own 
victimisation.201 
While the labelling of some offenders of rape as ‘hate-motivated rapists’ may well help 
to challenge the gendered notions of victimisation which have proliferated over the centuries, 
there remains one concerning ramification of pursuing rape as ‘hate crime’. That is, if the state 
begins to label some rapists as hate crime offenders and not others, a perception may arise that 
some rapes are worse than others.  This is indeed a possibility; one which may result in some 
feminist scholars/lobbyists being reluctant to pursue the inclusion of gender in hate crime 
policy.  We certainly do not wish to advocate a policy domain which actively creates a 
hierarchy of rape seriousness. However, we also believe that it is equally, if not more important, 
that the criminal law and sentencers have the ability to consider a range of aggravating and 
mitigating factors when determining the seriousness of an offence. There is a vast list of 
features which will aggravate an offence, including ones which change the type of offence an 
offender is charged with and those which are applied only at sentencing to enhance an 
offender’s penalty. 202  For example, the commission of an assault committed against an elderly 
victim may result in aggravation at sentencing if it is determined that the victim’s age made 
him or her additionally vulnerable to the offender’s actions. 203 In the case of racially motivated 
assault, the offence of assault is relabelled to that of ‘racially aggravated assault’ in recognition 
of the higher level of seriousness. The fact that the crime is motivated by prejudice enhances 
both the offender’s culpability (i.e. his blameworthiness for committing the offence increases) 
and the harms caused by the offence.204 These same principles already apply to rape cases 
where there is evidence to prove that the offence demonstrated or was motivated (wholly or 
partly) by racial, religious, sexual orientation, disability and/or transgender hostility. This list 
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must also include ‘gender’ if we are to truly recognise and combat the bias nature of such 
offences. 205   
 
CHALLENGES TO INCLUSION: PROVING GENDER ‘HOSTILITY’ BEYOND 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
 
Conceptually, at least, there is a persuasive argument that most, if not all, incidents of sexual 
violence are expressions of gender-based hostility that sustain women’s marginalised position 
within society.206 Such a conclusion has led some scholars to suggest that all rapes of women 
should be labelled as hate crimes, a perspective also held by many proponents of the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 in America. 207  For instance, Jennifer Gaffney believes that courts 
should adopt a rebuttable presumption of gender animus in all cases of rape based on the belief 
that such bias is present in almost all rape cases. 208 This would mean that ‘a defendant must 
show that he raped the victim while taking no account of her gender.’209  Such a position 
certainly pushes the current boundaries of what should and should not be included under the 
‘hate crime’ umbrella. 
While we certainly agree that most incidents of sexual violence can at least partly be 
explained by gender-based animus, we foresee several practical (and to a lesser extent 
conceptual) problems with such a conclusion. If gender-based hate is to be transposed 
successfully into law there must first be clear evidence of gender hostility from which a 
criminal court can then add the additional label of ‘hate crime’.210 The issue here is that it is up 
to the finder of fact, and not the judge, to determine whether identity-based hostility was present 
during the commission of an offence – based on the facts and context of the incident.211 The 
very fact that a woman has been raped may well provide a conceptual inference of gender 
‘hostility’, but it doubtful that it can in itself provide conclusive (or even presumptive) evidence 
of it from which a jury can satisfy itself that ‘hate’ was present during the commission of the 
offence. This is because violence directed against women will frequently involve a range of 
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situational and psychological factors (such as alcohol abuse, psychiatric and personality 
disorders) and/or as Nancy Crowell and Ann Burgess assert, the physiology of men.212 Thus 
while it is difficult to challenge the claim that almost all rapes are ‘gendered’, it will be more 
challenging to convince juries that there is, in every case, an expression of gender-based 
‘hostility’.   
One issue which will remain contestable (both in court and academia) is whether 
notions of power and control can always be intrinsically linked to notions of prejudice in cases 
involving sexual violence. Inevitably it will be asserted that desires to demonstrate power and 
control are rooted, not to hatred, but to other internalised psychological problems. These 
‘problems’ may be the result of an offender’s own childhood traumas, neglect and/or 
experiences of (sexual) abuse.213 It could be argued that some offenders of ‘power rapes’, for 
example, are motivated by a desire to obtain power (which is linked to their feelings of 
weakness and/or powerlessness) rather than their wanting to exert control. There is a subtle but 
important distinction here. For example, offender A may desire to obtain power because of an 
internalised feeling of worthlessness.  This can be compared to offender B whose desire to 
exert control over others emanates from his appetite to suppress women in order to keep them 
in ‘their place’. The actions of both offenders may well be ‘gendered’ in that in order to obtain 
power or exert control they specifically target women. However, while the victim’s gender is 
central to understanding both motivations, it could be argued that it is only the second offender 
who intends214 to demonstrate gender hostility.215   
In relation to racist hate crime, Ray et al have used a similar social-psychological 
approach to explaining the difference between internal and external feelings of hatred.216  They 
assert that many racist hate crimes are best explained, not by referring to the hatred that 
offenders have for their victim’s identity, but rather are the result of unacknowledged shame 
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that is experienced within themselves.217 This shame refers to their own place within society, 
which for many offenders is one of socio-economic disadvantage and educational 
underachievement. Rather than acknowledging their feelings of shame regarding their own 
shortcomings, some offenders will project their insecurities onto those more vulnerable than 
themselves, and it is these victims they go on to see as to blame for their own socio-economic 
instabilities.  As such, they suggest that some hate crimes are not really about hate at all but 
about internal insecurities which are the result of socio-structural inequalities.   
In terms of rape and other forms of gendered violence it too may be argued by lawyers 
and social psychologists that the main factor compelling the offender was his hatred or loathing 
of the ‘self’– whether acknowledged or not – as against his hatred of the female ‘other’. 
Without wishing to lend sympathy to the rape offender here, we simply note that many men 
will be susceptible to the gendered processes that they themselves go onto to perpetuate.  The 
difficulty for legal practitioners and jurors will be to determine whether an offence is one which 
is motivated, or that demonstrates, gender hostility or one which represents the manifestation 
of self-loathing on the part of the offender.  
It is no wonder that criminal justice practitioners are reluctant to comprehend VAW 
within the same paradigm of other types of hate crime with such conceptual complexities 
abound. Beverly McPhail and Diana DiNitto’s research in the US found that the majority of 
the prosecutors in their study believed that gendered violence is motivated by the perpetrator’s 
desire to have power and control over the victim but this was somehow different to it being 
motivated by hate. 218  The reluctance of criminal justice practitioners to acknowledge the 
potential bias nature of gendered violence, even in jurisdictions where gender is included in 
hate crime legislation, is illustrated in US statistics which show the low numbers of recorded 
gender bias hate crimes. Hodge has pointed out that in 2007 only one gender bias crime was 
recorded in Minnesota and New Jersey while a total of 25 were recorded in California. 219 In 
each of these jurisdictions many more racial, religious and homophobic crimes were 
recorded.220 Such findings indicate that there remains a belief by some legal actors that the 
motivations of rape are separate from the motivations of hate and even within states where hate 
crime legislation encompasses ‘gender’ bias, criminal justice actors have failed to acknowledge 
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that gender-motivated crimes ‘go beyond an intense dislike for someone, and that such crimes 
are committed in order to enforce a social hierarchy that is biased toward a particular group.’221 
The difficulties faced by prosecutors who do not see the similarities between power and control 
on the one hand and hate and bias on the other, mean that rape is frequently viewed as 
qualitatively different from the ‘conventional’ hate crime model – even if evidence in some 
cases shows the perpetrator’s direct bias against women.222    
What this short and rather superficial exploration of power and control tells us is that 
the reason why people desire power is not always easy to explain. Criminal justice practitioners, 
juries and judges alike will inevitably be confronted with decisions about whether an offender’s 
violence is motivated by gender hostility or whether it is an expression of power and control 
connected to his own insecurities. Much will depend on the type of evidence that the police 
and CPS gather, including what the offender himself says at police interview and during 
examination.  Such information will only be forthcoming if the ‘right’ questions are asked.223  
Added to this complex mix of aetiological determinants is often the excessive 
consumption of alcohol; in many cases consumed by both offender and victim. Alcohol 
consumption can lead to the lowering of inhibitions and to the misreading of interpersonal 
signals and cues.224  Sexual intercourse between those who are intoxicated where there is an 
absence of a free and deliberate choice by the victim can and should lead to a determination 
that the victim was raped.225 Of course in some cases the consumption of alcohol will simply 
allow the offender’s bias to rear its ugly head. But we may wish to add caution to equating such 
behaviour with an intentional subjugation of the victim’s gender. Indeed, there must be 
evidence to show that drunken sexual intercourse, without consent, is a demonstration of 
gender hostility – as against a drunken (though gendered) desire to gain sexual gratification 
with little regard to the bodily autonomy of the person he chooses to abuse.     
Other examples where demonstrations of gender hostility are less than clear cut include 
offenders who honestly, though unreasonably, believe in consent. Under section 1 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 the offender will be guilty of rape if the jury determine that his honest belief 
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in consent was nonetheless unreasonable. In such a situation it may be the case that his honest 
belief is based on a misogynistic belief that women who say ‘no’ actually mean ‘yes’ and in 
such situations this may give rise to evidence of gender hostility. However, in other cases he 
may simply have believed there was consent, perhaps based on a drunken mistake or because 
he is incapable of properly understanding social cues due to mental health conditions. Such 
men may misinterpret signals that women give in social situations while also lacking the self-
control to suppress associations between sexual gratification and aggression.226 Such behaviour 
is almost certainly gendered in that missed cues and acceptable sexual behaviours are 
constructed along gendered lines. Yet such misinterpretations cannot automatically be 
conflated as demonstrations of hostility – the offender’s intention, while based on gendered 
constructions of female sexuality, is not necessarily an intentional expression of hostility 
towards women per se.  
Clearly then, rape and other forms of violence directed against women are multifaceted 
phenomena that will have multiple and intersecting aetiological determinants.  The authors 
wish to be clear that we believe that a significant proportion of sexual violence will be 
motivated by gender bias and will therefore amount to expressions of ‘gender hostility’. 
However, it is important to acknowledge the complex reality of sexual violence and that gender 
‘hostility’ will not always be provable, or perhaps even present, in every case that comes before 
the courts – just as not all violence against gay men are the result of homophobia. Whether the 
law can differentiate between crimes that are gendered and those which involve gender hostility 
will be the greatest challenge in bringing ‘gender’ into the hate crime paradigm. Some of the 
same evidential problems observed in rape trials will persist in rape/hate crime cases, i.e. it 
may come down to one person’s word against another.227 As noted above there is also the 
potential for police officers and prosecutors to refuse to acknowledge the gender bias within 
many types of crimes. 228  We therefore suggest that the following traits/factors may aid 
practitioners tasked with identifying evidence of gender hostility:  
1. Vocalised hostility such as ‘bitch’ ‘whore’ ‘slag’ ‘slut’.  
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2. The presence of acts intended to demean the victim’s gender or sexual identity, such 
as burning her breasts, mutilating genitals, inserting objects such as knives and 
bottles into the vagina. 
3. A history of targeted abuse/violence directed at women. 
4. Derogatory remarks made about the victim’s gender during police questioning. 
5. Internet or paper based materials, in the possession of the offender, that indicate a 
dislike, resentment or prejudice towards women (as was the case with Marc Lepine).   
6. The victim’s own perception that the violence was used against her in order to put 
her in ‘her place’. 
7. An absence of other motivations such material acquisition, a mutual personal dislike 
of one another, or a prior altercation that was unrelated to gender identity. 
 
Intersectionality 
 
It is clear that there will be various evidential challenges when attempting to prove that VAW 
is motivated by, or demonstrates, gender hostility.  In addition to proving that such hostility 
exists will be further difficulties where the offender is motivated by multiple and intersecting 
prejudices. In a recent article aimed at reconceptualising our understanding of hate crimes, Neil 
Chakraborti and Jon Garland state the following: 
Recognizing that hate crime can be the outcome of prejudice based on multiple, 
distinct yet connected, lines is important for recognizing the reality behind both the 
experience of victimization and the commission of the offence.229  
The fact that targeted violence is not always based on a single type of hostility, or motivating 
factor for that matter, is important to our understanding of, and response to, hate crimes.  
Victims are often targeted because they are gay and disabled, Muslim and Asian, female and 
Black. It is not always easy to identify which prejudice is the main motivating factor or whether 
prejudices based on several identity traits are mutually inclusive. As Ault notes discrete 
categorizations:  
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... create a false dichotomy between the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘woman’ and ‘anti-
lesbian’ and ‘anti-woman’. Anti-lesbian is quintessentially anti-woman; violence 
against women of all sexual orientations is often overtly ‘anti-lesbian’.230   
Perhaps more than any other type of hate crime, gendered violence will concern intersecting 
prejudices and perceptions of vulnerability. We turn to a recent high profile case study to 
illustrate this point and to show how such cases can still be dealt with through hate crime laws. 
In May 2012 nine Asian men from the northern town of Rochdale were found guilty of a variety 
of sexual offences committed against a number of young white girls. The victims had been 
‘groomed’ over a sustained period of time and had been plighted with alcohol, drugs and 
gifts.231 The offences committed against these young victims included rape, trafficking of girls 
for sex and conspiracy to engage in sexual activity with a child. Several of the young victims 
were beaten and forced to have sex with ‘several men in a day, several times a week’.232 The 
case is notable for several reasons, not least because of the media coverage it garnered, but also 
because of the insidious debate around race and crime that ensured.233 For the most part, the 
gang’s crimes were labelled as a case of ‘sexual grooming’ which were the result of men using 
their power to gain the sexual gratification they had been lusting after. 234   The issue of 
vulnerability also became key to those attempting to explain the causes of this case, with the 
Assistant Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police publicly declaring that the crimes were 
about ‘adults preying on vulnerable young children’.235 It is of particular relevance to note that 
the police and CPS were at pains to deny that racial or religious bias had anything to do with 
the matter, with public statements persistently denying that such was the case.236 
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The first author has been less than convinced about either the way in which the 
vulnerability of the victims was framed, or the denial that racial or religious prejudice had 
anything to do with the victims’ experiences. 237  Walters notes that: 
Judge Gerald Clifton at sentencing told the offenders: ‘All of you treated [the 
victims] as though they were worthless and beyond any respect… One of the 
factors leading to that was the fact that they were not part of your community or 
religion.’238 
The judge’s comments when combined with the fact that the offenders specifically targeted 
only young white women provides a persuasive inference that their crimes were at least partly 
motivated by racial, religious and gender hostility. Despite this, the judge was never invited to 
consider any aggravating factors based on racial or religious hostility, while the absence of 
gender hostility within the legislation meant that this was never going to be an issue. Even after 
these points were raised in another journal, the Chief Prosecutor for the North West of England 
responded writing a letter which stated ‘I would suggest that Dr Walters in focusing on the 
supposed hate crime element has in fact misunderstood what these types of grooming cases 
actually involve.’239 In response to this we would like to note that ‘hate crime’ need not be an 
all-encompassing label but one which can be additionally attached to crimes in cases involving 
multiple intersecting motives.  The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 itself makes this very clear 
by stating that the hostility element of an offence need only be part of an offender’s motivation 
(s. 28(1)(b)), while the legislation also makes it clear that it matters not that the ‘offender’s 
hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in that paragraph.’ (s. 
28(3)).240 Hence, section 28 of the Act and sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 make it clear that offenders do not need to be solely motivated by one individual type of 
hostility in order that an offence be classified as a ‘hate crime’. 
 Furthermore, the meaning of the term ‘hostility’ itself should not just be understood 
simply as a form of hatred or bigotry but must also include expressions of prejudice whereby a 
victim is subjugated because of their identity and their ‘perceived’ vulnerability.241 Had the hate 
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crime provisions included ‘gender’, as a protected characteristic, a broader and more holistic 
understanding of the hostility evident in the Rochdale case may have been reached. To us the 
case provided evidence of the racial, religious and gendered hostilities all which underpinned 
the nature of the crimes – as well as issues relating to age and potentially social class.  All of 
these characteristics were relevant to the victim’s experiences. Their selection as rape victims 
came about first and foremost because of their gender, however when this characteristic was 
combined with their non-religious beliefs,  different ethnic background and young age they 
became highly vulnerable to the offenders’ desires to control, use and abuse them. As such we 
feel that the offenders’ hostilities, while not direct motivations of hatred or even bigotry, should 
have been conceived as demonstrations of prejudice – those which were expressed via a belief 
that the victims were less worthy of the social respect that the offenders afforded other members 
of their own male, adult, Asian, Muslim communities. The victims were in effect denied their 
human dignity by reason of who they were.  
 
The role of identity politics  
 
One of the reasons why offences such as those committed by the Rochdale Gang or Levi 
Bellfield have fallen outside of the hate crime paradigm is because there have been very few 
activists in the political domain calling for their inclusion.  In the US, many commentators and 
women’s advocacy groups have long argued for the inclusion of rape in hate crime 
legislation.242 Yet there has still to be any unified lobbying efforts for its inclusion in the UK.  
But why has this been the case? After all, there is now a wealth of empirical and theoretical 
evidence to show that women are victimised because of their gender.243 Recent research carried 
out by Hannah Mason-Bish may provide part of the answer to this question. She notes that 
‘social movement activists [are] central to how policy [is] defined and expanded to include 
other victim groups.’ 244  The inclusion of various characteristics have typically been 
accompanied by campaigns supported by lobby groups combined with empirical evidence 
illustrating the ‘social problem’ of specific types of targeted abuse.245 The victim groups and 
lobbyists that are aligned with gendered violence have already forged out their own policy 
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domain and political agendas. Many of these groups do not see crimes such as domestic 
violence as involving the same issues as hate crime. Part of the reason may be that rape or 
domestic violence simply does not fit the hate crime model that has developed over the past 20 
years.246 Mason-Bish illustrates this point by referring to one representative who explained that 
the concept of including gender within hate crime legislation had been particularly problematic 
as the women’s groups found it difficult to imagine an example of when ‘gender might be 
considered’ and that ‘domestic abuse might not be perpetrated because of the hatred of 
somebody’s gender’.247  However, a sea of change may now be upon us. A more recent study 
conducted by Aisha Gill and Hannah Mason-Bish found that the majority of women’s groups, 
academics and public sector practitioners that they surveyed felt that VAW should be included 
within hate crime policy.248 In fact, amongst those who were surveyed the highest proportion 
(34/88) stated that rape should be considered as a hate crime.249 Whether women’s groups will 
become more vociferous in the demands for inclusion is yet to be seen. The fact that such 
groups have yet to form a consensus themselves on this is illustrative of the contentious and 
contested nature of gendered violence and of ‘hate crime’.  
It is also significant to note that terms such as ‘rape’ and ‘domestic violence’ have an 
important history, with feminist scholars and activists devoting much time and energy to 
highlighting them as forms of gendered violence and for them to become embedded within 
criminological, victimological and legal landscapes. Martha Fineman notes that feminist 
approaches to law and policy have helped to usher in new legal concepts such as sexual 
harassment and cumulative provocation. 250 Subsequent amendments to the law have helped to 
change the way that society views VAW. For example, the wholesale reformation of the sexual 
offences legislation in 2003 is testimony to feminist approaches to understanding sexual 
violence and to limiting the gendered nature of the law itself.251 We might therefore wish to 
remain cautious about potentially undermining such changes. Of particular concern is that by 
re-terming sexual violence as ‘hate crime’ we potentially undo the decades of hard work that 
has been achieved in changing our understanding of gendered violence. Yet simultaneously, 
by excluding gendered violence from hate crime policy, we also fail to recognise that the 
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concept of the hate crime might help to deepen the gender analysis of rape:  most if not all 
women are selected as victims of sexual and domestic violence due to their gender and ignoring 
the gender animus present in many gender violence cases risks ‘... perpetuating the false - and 
often sexist - perceptions of why some men choose to rape women’.252 As alluded to above, 
treating rape as a hate crime could shift the focus away from the victim’s conduct to the rapist’s 
hatred of women253, thereby potentially positioning men’s hate within a gendered framework. 
 
Police resources and recording hate crime: it’s a numbers game 
 
A final practical reason why the state might resist the inclusion of gender within hate crime 
policy is that the sheer number of sexual offences (and other types of VAW) could overwhelm 
the practitioners who are tasked with operationalizing hate crime policy. 254 Identity groups 
have spent the best part of 50 years lobbying government for greater protection from targeted 
violence.  Their minority status has made this a long and arduous fight.  One concern regarding 
the inclusion of gender within hate crime legislation is that small minority groups will be 
pushed to the periphery of hate crime policy because of the large numbers of gendered hate 
crimes which occur every year.255 
We refer again to recent statistics taken from the Crime Survey for England and Wales 
to demonstrate this point. Between 2012/13 there were an estimated 278,000 hate crimes in 
England and Wales. 256 In comparison there are an estimated 366,000 - 404,000 sexual offences 
committed against women each year,257  while over one million women are the victim of 
domestic violence.258 Excluding all other types of gendered violence this would still dwarf the 
total numbers of already defined ‘hate crimes’. Of course, not all VAW would result in hate 
crime investigations, but there remains the potential that police officers and other criminal 
justice practitioners specialising in hate crime will become preoccupied with gendered violence 
ultimately at the expense of all other types of hate crime.  
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Conversely, Mason-Bish points out that resistance to the inclusion of gendered violence 
as hate crime can also be founded on the fear that it will undermine the level of service that is 
currently offered to victims of rape and domestic violence.259 The resources and expertise 
currently on offer to combat gendered violence far outstrips that of hate crime.260 The fear, then, 
is that inclusion will undermine the special status that gendered violence currently holds, 
leaving victims of gender bias offences marginalised by the totality of other forms of hate crime.  
Ultimately, the competing political agendas of the anti-hate crime movement and women’s 
rights groups mean that the inclusion of gender is simply too controversial for legislators to 
seriously consider. 261 
This article posits that the inclusion of gender within hate crime provisions would not 
undermine the current body of expertise and resource deployment for gendered violence. This 
is especially the case if only those offences where clear evidence of gender hostility exists are 
operationalized as ‘hate crime’. There is no reason to believe that the current body of expertise 
would disappear based on the fact that some incidents of VAW would become aggravated by 
gender hostility. In fact, in many ways such aggravation simply reflects what many service 
providers have been saying for many years, that gendered violence is ‘gendered’. Just as BME 
and religious organisations continued to focus their attentions on supporting the needs of these 
communities after the inclusion of sexual orientation, transgender and disability under the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, so too will those organisations set up to tackle the victimisation of 
women.  We do, however, remain more concerned about the potential marginalising effects of 
subsuming gendered violence into the current hate crime paradigm on smaller marginalised 
groups. After all, the initial hate crime movement was, like the feminist movement, aimed at 
uncovering the problem of targeted victimisation and to ensure that ethnic minority groups 
receive the legal protection they deserve.262 If the impact of including gender into hate crime 
policy is to marginalise other vulnerable groups we would remain reluctant to advocate its 
inclusion.  However again we feel that there is good reason to believe that this is unlikely to 
happen. For example, Phyllis Gerstenfeld notes that jurisdictions in America that have included 
gender-bias offences under their hate crime laws have not been overwhelmed by this inclusion, 
nor has it distracted the attention of prosecutors away from dealing with other types of hate 
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crimes.263  It is unlikely that the thousands of cases of sexual and domestic violence recorded 
by the police would be ultimately conflated as hate crime.  Like racial or homophobic crimes, 
there would need to be evidence of the prejudiced nature of the incident which proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that the offender demonstrated or was (partly) motivated by hostility.264 
Hence the inclusion of gender within hate crime policy would not mean that rape, domestic 
violence, forced prostitution etcetera would all automatically be reclassified as ‘hate crime’, 
rather incidents would become additionally labelled as and when there is evidence of gender-
based hostility. The same resources, knowledge and bodies that help to support victims of 
gendered violence would remain. The additional label of hate crime would however help to 
further the protections offered to women by changing the way we think about gender-motivated 
crimes.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has argued for the inclusion of ‘gender hostility’ within the UK’s framework of 
hate crime legislation.265 The article has used the offence of rape to demonstrate the often 
biased nature of VAW.  The fact that many such crimes involve hostility against women and 
additionally cause heightened levels of harm amongst women as a group, leads us to the 
conclusion that gender-motivated crimes should at least be considered as a type of ‘hate crime’ 
by those state agencies tasked with tackling the problem. However, it is not just conceptual 
parallels that can be drawn between gendered violence and other types of hate crime.  There 
are also various moral and practical reasons for its inclusion. In particular, we believe that the 
law of ‘hate crime’ would help to challenge the gender bias that persists within the current 
framework of sexual offences by reformulating certain ‘sexual’ offences as both ‘sexual’ and 
‘hate’ crimes. This is not to suggest that all rapes are hate crime. As we have highlighted 
throughout this paper there must be tangible evidence that can be used to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the offence was motivated, or demonstrated, gender hostility. We believe 
that where such evidence exists it must be used in order to support the re-orientation of 
responsibility away from victims by refocusing on the offender’s hate-motivation. The 
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expressed denunciation conveyed by hate crime laws would additionally assist in supporting 
social norms that challenge female victimisation while simultaneously rejecting a culture of 
victim-blame. In particular, the legal proscription of ‘gender aggravated rape’ would help to 
eradicate gendered misconceptions about the nature of rape as well as the ‘rape myths’ which, 
we believe, continue to hinder the effectiveness of rape law reform.  
 
 
